

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 August 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Mounir Zahran (Egypt)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 661st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish to recall that immediately after this plenary meeting the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations on its improved and effective functioning under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmed Kamal, the representative of Pakistan.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representative of the Russian Federation, Mr. Valery Zemskov, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. ZEMSKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): It is my understanding that today I will be the only speaker to address this meeting and this makes me feel particularly responsible. I hope that I won't disappoint you with my statement.

First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, upon your assuming the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. The very first plenary meeting conducted under your leadership shows clearly that the Conference on Disarmament is in reliable and competent hands. Our delegation will be greatly pleased to support you fully in your important duties.

Let me also express our gratitude to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Novoa of Cuba, for the skill and tireless efforts he applied to leading the Conference and achieving practical results.

In my statement today I would like specifically to dwell on just one issue, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery. This topic is not new. It is present in one form or another in practically all statements and declarations made by the participants in the Conference. Moreover, there is a danger that it may simply be "talked to death", so emptying a problem of vital importance for all of mankind of its substantive content. At the same time, the realities of our time with its substantial results in restraining the arms race, results that create new, sometimes even more complex tasks, call for further and still more active efforts from the world community with respect to consolidation of the accomplishments in the field of disarmament and conscientious implementation of the disarmament and arms control agreements. Now, when the disarmament processes have begun to yield their first major fruits, no one should have any justification whatsoever for seeking out and acquiring means and technologies of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless the situation regarding these issues is not clear-cut and many facts confirm that the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological, remains a cause of concern in the world.

What conclusion can be drawn from this? We believe that the global non-proliferation regimes already created should be supported by concrete steps and practical arrangements concerning a number of issues that would inter alia take into account regional particularities and would be aimed at those regions and countries that cause concern as regards non-proliferation. In other words, there is a need for a clear and realistic programme of measures to strengthen and improve existing regimes. The solution of this

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problem would have a positive effect on the establishment and strengthening of a new political climate of cooperation and confidence in this post-confrontation period. On the success of our efforts in this respect there will also depend the outcome of the 1995 conference that is to decide what we view as the vital issue of the unlimited extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In short, in implementing its foreign policy, including in the field of international security, the Russian Federation will continue to give priority to the non-proliferation problem.

While proposing that an intensive dialogue on this issue should be begun within the framework of the leading disarmament forum that our Conference is, the Russian delegation would like to focus your attention on the following major practical issues, progress on which could, in our opinion, substantially improve the situation as regards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. First Russia attaches particular, priority importance to the preservation and comprehensive reinforcement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We intend to ensure that the 1968 Treaty becomes universal and that the 1995 Conference makes it of unlimited duration. In this context we proceed from the premise that full-fledged participation in this treaty by three former Republics of the USSR, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as non-nuclear States would be an important, maybe even decisive factor of the conservation of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The position of principle of the Russian Federation on this issue is well known and is not subject to any adjustment.

Furthermore the initiation of multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would contribute effectively to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the success of the 1995 conference. The consensus decision by our forum on this issue was highly appreciated in Moscow. For the first time in the long history of discussion of this problem, all five nuclear Powers, together with other participants in the Conference, agreed to work for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This step taken by the Conference is, of course, only the beginning of painstaking work on the text of the treaty and we intend to take a very active part in this endeavour. It is important to ensure that this process continues in a favourable atmosphere of silence at the nuclear test sites.

Our approaches to the practical side of this issue, that is how to organize the negotiations, have already been outlined. I would like to confirm that we are in favour of parallelism in the negotiating process: on the one hand, multilateral negotiations within the framework of this CD in accordance with a clear mandate defining the specific parameters of such negotiations and the scope of the problems, and on the other hand consultations among the five nuclear Powers as an important element of the overall work on the treaty.

To move on to another point, the Russian Federation continues to have negative security assurances for non-nuclear States at the forefront of its disarmament agenda. Given the importance of resolving this task in the

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context of the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, our delegation supports the beginning of concrete negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in order to elaborate an appropriate multilateral agreement or convention. We believe that over the past 10 years and more this problem has been comprehensively examined in our forum. Many delegations' positions have gelled - in favour, we would hope, of such an instrument, and of one containing a common formula for negative assurances. The time has come for practical work on a text, for the laying down on paper of individual provisions and whole sections of the future agreements.

For its part, the Russian delegation will try to make its contribution to the preparation of a final product, first of all from the point of view of searching for a mutually acceptable wording for assurances. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the language contained in our statement concerning assurances of Ukraine's security. It reads:

"The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces or allies conducted by a State of this kind that is linked by an agreement of association with a nuclear-weapon State or that acts together with, or with the support of a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out such an attack".

Of course, the language elaborated by other delegations to the Conference on Disarmament is of great practical value. In particular, we believe that the well-known proposals made by the delegations of Nigeria and France could be used successfully.

In sum, all the prerequisites are to hand for the resolution of this important issue. All interested States members of the Conference should now demonstrate political will, an appropriate response to the needs of the time.

Second, in the context of the non-proliferation problem, I would like to put particular emphasis on issues related to the policy of the international community in the field of nuclear fissionable materials produced for nuclear weapons purposes. A lot has been said on this topic as well, with particular attention given to the risk of stockpiling excessive amounts of fissionable materials and the need to establish strict controls and restrictions on such materials. It seems that in this area as well we need to move from words to deeds.

We propose the beginning in the Conference on Disarmament of substantive negotiations on the elaboration of a multilateral (meaning, of course, with the participation of all nuclear and "threshold" States) agreement on the controlled cessation of the production of fissionable materials. We proceed from the assumption that in the context of such an agreement there will probably be a need for an arrangement whereby all nuclear Powers place the weapons-related materials freed as a result of nuclear arms reductions under international control under the aegis of IAEA. The issue of the exchange of

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data on the amounts of such materials and facilities for storing them could be resolved within the framework of such arrangements.

Third, our delegation, understanding the importance of the issue of the transparency of arms supplies for the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and of overall stability and predictability, is actively participating in the work of the relevant ad hoc committee and is contributing, or trying to contribute to the search for the necessary arrangements.

In this connection, I would like to dwell in the problem of export control, and on an aspect of that control of which we have unfortunately yet to hear in this forum. I am referring to the activities of the Coordinating Committee, otherwise known as CoCom, and, to be more precise, to its discriminatory practices with regard to Russia. As it is well known, fundamental changes have taken place in the international arena and the "cold war" is now a thing of the past. It might be thought that its ugly attributes should also have vanished without trace, but that has not happened and CoCom continues to try to impose on Russia its discredited rules of the game. The position of the Russian Federation on this issue is clear: CoCom's discriminatory policy and practices must be ended. That would be in keeping with the way things are today. But if this institution is to be retained, would it not be better to transform it into an instrument of constructive cooperation for non-proliferation purposes?

We are prepared to contribute towards that, including through practical steps taken by ourselves, for example the introduction in Russia of an effective system of export controls harmonized with existing international regimes in this field. I would like to inform you that we are now seriously examining the possibility of participating in the MTCR. In the circumstances we justifiably expect that the discriminatory measures impeding Russia's access to the world market of space services will be lifted.

The confrontation in such matters along North/South lines must also be overcome. That will, of course, require complementary efforts both from States supplying, and from States receiving high technology, including from their representatives to the Conference on Disarmament when we consider, for example, the problem of increasing transparency in the field of technology transfer.

Fourth, the Russian Federation, reaffirming its assessment of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a landmark in the process of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, considers the speedy entry into force of this Convention to be an important guarantee of non-proliferation of these weapons. We will continue our cooperation with other interested States within the framework of the preparatory committee in The Hague. We must also direct our joint efforts towards making the Convention universal.

Fifth, Russia is, naturally, keeping in mind the problem of strengthening the regime of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. We welcome the convening in 1994 of a special conference of the States parties to the Convention that would take a decision on further steps to strengthen its

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verification machinery. We consider as useful the preparation by the ad hoc group of governmental experts from States parties during its meeting in September of a consensus report containing recommendations on potential verification measures.

That is the programme of action that we are proposing and those are our thoughts concerning the non-proliferation problem. They could, as we see it, become a basis for further successful international cooperation, including cooperation within our forum. It would be extremely useful for us to hear the opinions of other participants in the Conference as well.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I wish to thank Mr. Valery Zemskov, representative of the Russian Federation, for his statement on non-proliferation and also for the kind words he addressed to me as President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

That concludes our work for today. Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I wish to welcome Dr. Mahmoud Karim, my colleague, with whom we worked in the past in the Conference on Disarmament. He has joined the Egyptian delegation during its presidency of the Conference. I wish to welcome Dr. Karim, who is now Director of Disarmament Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo.

I would like to recall that, as announced earlier, immediately after this meeting the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations on its improved and effective functioning under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmed Kamal, representative of Pakistan. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 August, at 10 a.m. and I would also like to take this opportunity to remind you that after Thursday's plenary the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency will hold an informal meeting to consider its report. The meeting stands adjourned

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.